A Light-Weight Authentication Scheme for Air Force Internet of Things by Cao, Xi Hang et al.
A Light-Weight Authentication Scheme for Air
Force Internet of Things
Xi Hang Cao and Xiaojiang Du
Department of Computer & Information Sciences
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA, USA
{xi.hang.cao, dux}@temple.edu
E. Paul Ratazzi
Air Force Research Laboratory Information Directorate
Rome, NY, USA
edward.ratazzi@us.af.mil
Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is ubiquitous because
of its broad applications and the advance in communication
technologies. The capabilities of IoT also enable its important
role in homeland security and tactical missions, including Re-
connaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition
(RISTA). IoT security becomes the most critical issue before
its extensive use in military operations. While the majority of
research focuses on smart IoT devices, treatments for legacy
dumb network-ready devices are lacking; moreover, IoT devices
deployed in a hostile environment are often required to be
dumb due to the strict hardware constraints, making them
highly vulnerable to cyber attacks. To mitigate the problem,
we propose a light-weight authentication scheme for dumb
IoT devices, in a case study of the UAV-sensor collaborative
RISTA missions. Our scheme utilizes the covert channels in
the physical layer for authentications and does not request
conventional key deployments, key generations which may cause
security risks and large overhead that a dumb sensor cannot
afford. Our scheme operates on the physical layer, and thus it
is highly portable and generalizable to most commercial and
military communication protocols. We demonstrate the viability
of our scheme by building a prototype system and conducting
experiments to emulate the behaviors of UAVs and sensors in
real scenarios.
Index Terms—IoT, UAV, Authentication, Physical Layer,
Covert Channel
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Smart Things and the Dumb Things
Internet of Things (IoT) provides us with unprecedented
opportunities [1], it also poses challenges, such as privacy
and security [2]. In general, “things” in IoT refers to devices
that are smart, meaning that they are capable of computing,
sensing, actuating, and being connected via the Internet; these
smart things can be found across our lives, from traditional
IT orientated devices [3], such as smartphones and laptop
computers, to more living orientated devices, such as smart
lights, smart appliances, and electronic personal assistance.
In a more broad sense, “things” in IoT may also include sen-
sors and actuators that equip with extremely low computing
capabilities [4]–[6], and we call these devices dumb. These
dumb things may be legacy devices in which the electronics
and designs are based on an older generation of technologies,
and these dumb things may be mission-specific devices in
which trade-offs are made between functionalities and special
mission requirements, such as low-power consumption, tiny
size, etc. In addition to the traditional IoT security challenges
in the scenarios of only smart things, the security challenges
in the scenarios of both smart things and dumb things are
considerably more critical and difficult to overcome, due to
that the lack of computational capability in the dumb things
makes conventional security strategies (e.g., key generation
[7], [8], key management [9]–[12], etc.) inapplicable. In this
study, we aim to tackle the challenge in the latter scenario in
which we propose a light-weight authentication strategy for
dumb authenticators.
B. IoT in the Air Force and Our Use Case
As the technologies encapsulated in the realm of the IoT
have become mature, the US military, especially the Air Force
(AF), has identified the tremendous application potentials of
the IoT in operations and missions. The paradigm of IoT
has been adopted in different areas. In addition to the IoT
applications in the commercial and civilian domains, the IoT
adoption in the AF also spans its applications in the battlefield
and tactical environments.
A typical use case in the RISTA missions is shown in Fig. 1
[13] where a general architecture of UAV-sensor network
system is demonstrated. Usually, this use case appears in
the air-ground cooperative surveillance operations [14]. A
collection of small, low-powered, low-memory sensors reside
at distributed geo-locations. These sensors operate in two
modes: a sensing mode and a transmission mode. In the
sensing mode (low energy consumption), sensors make envi-
ronmental measurements and write the data into memory; in
the transmission mode (high energy consumption), the sensors
activate the link to the UAV and transmit the stored data.
The transmission mode is activated by beacons when a UAV
flies above them, and the transmission is carried on as the
UAVs maintain an effective communication distance. Because
of this data collecting process, sensors can preserve energy by
avoiding constant data transmission which may cause high
energy consumptions; adequate frequent data transmissions
are required to prevent data loss due to memory cycling. The
UAV performs as a data transmission relay or a data fusionDISTRIBUTION A. Approved for public release: distribution unlimited. Case
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Fig. 1: A demonstration of the air-ground collaborative
surveillance operation, in which UAVs are the platforms to
collect and process the data obtained from the ground sensors.
In a battlefield or hostile environment, adversarial UAVs and
sensors are expected. Therefore, an effective authentication
scheme is crucial for mission success.
platform to overcome communication and data transmission
problems caused by distance and blockages.
C. Contributions
We propose an approach which is based on covert channels
in the physical layer. Specifically, we encode secret patterns
within the physical layer controllable parameters, including,
transmission power level, transmission frequency, and beacon
intervals. These physical layer covert channels are incredibly
portable and generalizable to various commercial and military
communication standards and are simple and effective enough
that will not cause computational overhead and thus suitable
for dumb authenticators. More details of our approach can be
found in Section IV.
II. RELATED WORKS
Our authentication scheme combines the advantages of two
ideas: physical layer fingerprints and covert channels. In this
section, we briefly review some state-of-the-art works in this
two research areas.
A. Related works in Authentications Using Physical Layer
Fingerprints
It has been demonstrated by many previous studies that
by utilizing the uniqueness of the physical layer features,
RF/wireless devices can be identified with high accuracy;
for example, RFID device identifications [15] and transmitter
identifications [16]. Moreover, the physical layer fingerprint
(or specifically, radio frequency fingerprint, RFF) has been
used in wireless security [17], including, authentication [18]
and intrusion detection [19]. It is notable that some of
the previous works focused on devices with some specific
components, so those features are not generalizable to many
applications. Usually, features are extracted from time domain,
frequency domain, and wavelet domain. Time domain features
(also called radiometric) include amplitude, phase, and other
more complex feature that usually by comparing the obtained
waveform to a reference/ideal waveform, for example, clock
skew variation [20], transient properties [21], waveform accu-
racy [22], etc. Frequency domain features are usually obtained
by applying Fourier transform to the waveform. For enhancing
the identification power, combinations of the feature are used.
B. Authentications Using Covert Channels
There has been research about covert channels in wireless
communications, in both design and detection. Usually, a
covert channel is any communication channel that can be
exploited by a process to transfer information in such a way
that breaks a system’s security policy [23]; therefore, a covert
channel poses challenges in information security. For more
efficient detections, one has to explore the possible covert
channel, so there had been many covert channel designs
proposed. Many of them can be categorized into either storage
covert channel [24], [25] or timing covert channels [26]. In a
storage covert channel, the covert message is encoded into a
particular portion of the legitimate traffic; in a timing covert
channel, a covert message is inserted by manipulating the
typical time-based properties of the system, such as CPU
time and inter-packet delay [27]. Some recently proposed
covert channels have explored other perspectives of the com-
munication system, for example, power [28], radio waveform
[29], and modulation schemes [30]. Our approach for UAV
authentication is similar to covert channel communication, in
the sense that the information transmitted is “hidden” within a
medium. In our approach, the information of the secret pattern
is hidden within the transmission power, frequency/channel,
and beacon interval, which we call physical layer covert
channels.
III. MODELS
A. System Model
In our system, we consider two types of devices. One type
is called smart device, which is capable for rigorous tasks,
such as computing, communicating, and actuating; in our use
scenario, this type of device refers to the UAVs for collecting
data from the field. Another type is called dumb device,
whose capability is limited by electronic design and mission
requirements. For power sustainability, in the majority of the
time, dumb devices operate in a low-power consumption mode
for environmental sensing and data recording. Once activated,
they will operate in the data transmission mode, in which
the dumb devices transmit their stored data to an authorized
party and clear their memory for the coming record cycle. The
schematic of the possible mutual authentication is shown in
Fig. 2. When the authenticator is a smart device, we have the
flexibility to adopt conventional IoT security strategies [31].
The challenges lie in the cases that the authenticator is a dumb
device which is not compatible with conventional strategies
(e.g., key-based schemes). Our proposed approach focuses on
the case in which a dumb authenticator authenticates a smart
Fig. 2: A system model schematic depicts the various types
of authentication schemes to consider
device. The authentication between two dumb devices is not
considered in this study.
B. Threat Model
We consider a smart adversarial device (UAV), which is
trying to communicate with the dumb devices (sensors) and re-
quest the stored sensing data (the UAV on the right of Fig. 1).
The adversarial UAV sends beacons to the sensors below it
and try to activate their transmission mode; however, because
of our proposed physical layer convert channel authentication
scheme, the adversarial UAV will not pass the authentication
process, and thus, the sensors will refuse to transmit the stored
data. Adversarial parties may also place malicious sensors
into surveillance terrain to send misleading/confusing data
(as shown in Fig. 1). In this case, a legitimate UAV can
identify the malicious sensors by recognizing the abnormal
data transmission timings and unregistered physical layer
fingerprints.
Beyond the above threats, the threats from traditional In-
ternet [32] are also applicable to our used scenario. In the
following, we list the threats (their breaches of security goals):
• Message Replay (Authentication)
• Impersonation (Authentication)
• Eavesdrop (Confidentiality)
• Man-In-The-Middle (Integrity, Confidentiality)
IV. PROPOSED APPROACH: AUTHENTICATIONS BASED ON
PHYSICAL LAYER COVERT CHANNELS AND SECRET
COMMUNICATION PATTERNS
The constraints of hardware and the lack of computa-
tional power in dumb devices pose significant challenges
in exploiting a wide range of existing effective physical
layer fingerprints proposed in the published literature [20].
Without adequate electronic components, the dumb sensors
cannot detect the physical layer signals from other devices;
nevertheless, without advanced processing units, the dumb
sensor cannot extract the hidden features within the signals.
We proposed an authentication scheme which leverages the
primitive physical layer parameters in communication and
use these parameters as covert channels to transmit secret
patterns for dumb authenticators. Specifically, we use the
physical layer parameters: transmission power level (txpower),
transmission frequency/channel (freq), and beacon interval
(beacon int). These physical layer parameters are so primitive
that even without specific electronic components, the dumb
authenticators can still detect them; in addition, these physical
parameters can be used as covert channels, such that without
knowing them a priori, one cannot discover these covert chan-
nels entirely and easily; more importantly, we utilize these
covert channels to transmit secret patterns which can only
be known by authorized parties, and this can tremendously
enhance the authentication scheme.
A. Physical Layer Controllable Parameters
a) Transmission Power (Txpower) and Received Signal
Strength Intensity (RSSI): In wireless communications, trans-
mission power (txpower) is the amount of energy used when
a transmitter emits the radio wave; the level of txpower is
usually affected by the magnitude, frequency, and modulation
scheme based on a communication protocol. Usually, the
RSSI of a specific txpower, follows an exponentially decaying
curve as the distance between the transmitter and receiver
increases. Although insignificant, the RSSI of a txpower can
be affected by factors of multipath, shadowing, and path loss
[33]. Because of the noisy nature of the RSSI, while we use
txpower as a covert channel, we will use the high and low
levels to indicate binary digits (1’s and 0’s) as the transmitted
patterns.
b) Wireless Communication Frequency/Channel (Freq):
A particular frequency spectrum is assigned to a specific wire-
less communication standard. A spectrum may be subdivided
into channels with a center frequency and bandwidth. For
example, the 802.11bg standards use the 2.4 GHz band which
sub-divided into 14 channels spaced 5 Mhz apart. In military
wireless communication standards, one can use the Link-16
standard [34], which utilize the L-band (969 - 1206 MHz). For
utilizing frequency/channel as a covert channel, a transmitter
switches the transmission frequency/channel within the band
when beacons are sent to the sensor.
c) Beacon Interval (Beacon int): In our use scenario,
dumb sensors are in sensing mode until they receive beacons
from a UAV. After the first beacon is received, the sensors
keep learning to the following beacons and time the timings
of following beacons. The time difference between any two
consecutive beacons is defined as the beacon interval. In
our covert channel, the beacon interval is measured in a
relative unit. Namely, we do not use absolute time (i.e.,
100 milliseconds, 200 milliseconds, etc.). Instead, we use the
interval between the first and second beacons as a time unit,
and any following beacon intervals are integer multiples of
this time unit.
B. Covert Channels Design and Authentication Process
This section presents our covert channel design using
the aforementioned physical layer parameters and shows the
authentication process using an example. Before the sensors
are deployed, there should be several preset patterns stored
or hardcoded in the sensors’ memories, such that the sensors
can quickly match the desired covert channel patterns versus
incorrect patterns.
Channel 1
Channel 6 
Channel 11
Txpower LOW
Txpower HIGH
Time
1 TU 2 TUs 2 TUs
(010, 1, ) (101, 6, 1) (010, 6, 2) (101, 11, 2)
. . . 
. . . 
(a)
Channel 1
Channel 6 
Channel 11
Txpower LOW
Txpower HIGH
Time
1 TU 2 TUs 2 TUs
(010, 1, ) (111, 6, 1) (010, 6, 2) (101, 11, 2)
. . . 
. . . 
(b)
Channel 1
Channel 6 
Channel 11
Txpower LOW
Txpower HIGH
Time
1 TU 2 TUs 2 TUs
(010, 1, ) (101, 1, 1) (010, 6, 2) (101, 11, 2)
. . . 
. . . 
(c)
Channel 1
Channel 6 
Channel 11
Txpower LOW
Txpower HIGH
Time
1 TU 1 TUs 3 TUs
(010, 1, ) (101, 6, 1) (010, 6, 1) (101, 11, 3)
. . . 
. . . 
(d)
Fig. 3: An example of a covert channel secret pattern and associated possible incorrect patterns. In the figures, the horizontal
direction indicates the time and the vertical direction indicates frequency/channel. (a): the correct sequence of four triplets
stored in the memory in the sensors; (b) - (d): incorrect patterns due to the unmatched txpower pattern, channel, and beacon
interval, respectively. Unmatched triplets are colored in gray
After a sensor receives the first beacon from a UAV,
the sensor will measure the txpower, frequency/channels
switching, and beacon timings continuously (with an ade-
quately high sampling rate). Based on the observations of
these three physical layer parameters, a sequence of triplets
are generated and stored: (txpower pattern0, channel0, ),
(txpower pattern1, channel1, 1 TU), (txpower pattern2,
channel2, beacon int2), (txpower pattern3, channel3,
beacon int3), · · · . Noting that the subscripts indicate the
order of measurements. Upon receiving the first (0-indexed)
beacon, the beacon interval is not available, so the third
entry (beacon interval) in the first triplet is absent, and
because we use the time difference between the first and
second beacon as the reference of 1 time unit (TU), the third
entry (beacon interval) in the second triplet is always 1 TU.
The measurements will carry on until the desired pattern is
matched, or terminate if any incorrect triplet appears.
An example of a secret pattern consists of a sequence of
four triplets is shown in Fig. 3. The correct pattern is shown
in Fig. 3a, with four triplets: (010, 1, ), (101, 6, 1), (010,
6, 2), (101, 11, 2); Fig. 3b shows a failed case where in the
second beacon, the txpower does not match the correct pattern;
Fig. 3c shows a failed case where the second beacon is not in
the correct channel in the communication band; Fig. 3d shows
a failed case where the beacon intervals between the second
and third beacon do not match the correct value.
C. Application Layer Secret Communication Pattern for Au-
thentication
After a smart device (UAV) passes the physical layer covert
channel authentication, a connection between the smart device
and the dumb device (sensor) is established. If the dumb
device is capable, our authentication scheme has the flexibility
to add an extra authentication step before the stored data are
transmitted. Specifically, the dumb device requests a secret
message in the application layer for authentication. If the
application layer message sent by the smart device matches
the secret communication pattern, the dumb device will start
transmitting the stored data; otherwise, the connection be-
tween them will be terminated immediately.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the situation that under the
proposed authentication scheme, how the possible threats
listed in Section. III-B are handled:
• Message Replay (Authentication): Messages (data) sent
from the sensors are time-stamped or with unique iden-
tifiers; therefore, replayed messages will be ignored.
• Impersonation (Authentication): In order to obtain the
credentials in our physical layer covert channel authenti-
cation scheme, an adversarial device needs to figure out
both the types of covert channel and the covert channel
secret messages, which requires O(2nL) trials to crack,
using a brute force approach, without considering the
factors of frequency and beacon interval. The letter n
indicates the number of bits in the txpower pattern in
each triplet, and the letter L indicates the length of the
triplet sequence. Therefore, when the quantity of nL is
large (e.g., 128 or above), the secret message is extremely
difficult to crack.
• Eavesdrop (Confidentiality): Theoretically, the threat of
eavesdropping can be efficiently handled by encryption;
for example, after the transmission is activated between a
UAV and a sensor, they can establish a key for symmetric
encryption to prevent eavesdropping.
• Man-In-The-Middle (Integrity, Confidentiality): When
there is no attack, a UAV and a ground sensor directly
communicate with each other using wireless. For the
Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack, an adversary needs
to relay messages between the UAV and sensor, which
significantly increases the delay of the communication.
Hence, the MITM attack may be detected based on the
delay of the messages.
VI. PROTOTYPE AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Prototype System Setup
a) Hardware: We built a prototype system consisted of
three Raspberry Pi 3 Model B boards (Fig. 4) to emulate the
use scenario in our study. Two of them were configured as
WiFi (802.11b) access points, with names Pi1 and Pi2, to
emulate the smart devices (UAVs); one of them, with name
Pi dumb, was normally configured, to emulate a dumb device
(sensor), which could connect to either of the access points
(UAVs).
b) Software: The access point functionality was realized
by using the hostapd tool. To emulate the physical layer
covert channel secret patterns, we altered the access point
settings, i.e., txpower, channel, and beacon interval, by editing
the configuration file hostapd.conf. The access point settings
can be detected by the Pi dumb, running the iw wlan0 scan
command in terminal. To automate the pattern generation
and pattern detection process, we created scripts in Python
language using the time and subprocess packages.
Raspberry Pi 
“Pi1”
Raspberry Pi  
“Pi2”
Raspberry Pi  
“Pi_dumb”
Fig. 4: A prototype system to emulate the use scenario using
three Raspberry Pi boards.
B. Extracting Triplets
Once a Raspberry Pi board is configured as an access point
(AP), it will start transmitting beacons to the environment.
Any compatible network interface card can detect the received
signal strength intensity (RSSI), frequency/channel, beacon
interval, and other parameters from the AP. These parameters
can be read by using the scan command in the iw utility or
other networking tools.
In this experiment, we create a Python script in Pi dumb
and let it automatically and continuously (with a sampling rate
of 5 Hz) to detect the wireless parameters from the two APs
(Pi1 and Pi2). Fig. 5 shows two observed triplets generated
Fig. 5: Two example triplets to show the difference of the
two access point in txpower pattern, frequency/channel, and
beacon interval
by Pi1 and Pi2. In the top penal, we can see the txpower
(RSSI) patterns. The txpower patterns generated by Pi1 and
Pi2 are 110 and 101, respectively. The second panel shows the
results returned by the scan command in the iw utility, and
we can obtain frequency/channel, beacon interval and other
information from the APs. The triplet extracted from Pi1 and
Pi2 are (110, 6, 100) and (101, 1, 200), respectively. If we
suppose Pi1 is a legitimate UAV and Pi2 is an adversarial
UAV, then the dumb sensor (Pi dumb) can easily distinguish
them.
C. The Effect of Distance on RSSI
As the distance increases, the RSSI generally follows an
exponentially decaying curve. In this experiment, we measure
the RSSI profiles measured by Pi dumb at different distances
as Pi1 increases the txpower from the minimum (around 7
dBm) to maximum (around 13 dBm).
a) High/Low RSSI v.s. High/Low Txpower: The first
batch of measurements were made indoor, and the distance
was from 0.5 meters to 9.0 meters. The RSSI profiles of the
indoor measurements are shown in Fig.6a.
(a) indoor (b) outdoor
Fig. 6: The measured profiles of RSSI as the distance and
txpower change in different environments: (a) indoor envi-
ronment; (b) outdoor environment
We can notice that when the distance is over 3 meters,
the RSSI corresponding to the maximum txpower is lower
than the RSSI corresponding to the minimum power at 0.5
meters. Therefore, in our use scenario, as a UAV flies above
a sensor, the high/low pattern will be distorted by the changes
in distance. To remedy this, we can use a trick: instead
of observing the absolute high/low pattern of an RSSI, the
sensors observe the steep transitions.
b) Maximum Operating Distance: We found that when
the distance was beyond 40 meters, Pi dumb could no longer
detect the beacons from Pi1. As shown in Fig. 6b, when
the distance was larger than 30 meters, the RSSI difference
between the maximum and the minimum txpower was too
small, such that the high/low levels or the transition may not
be correctly detected. Therefore, in order for your scheme to
operate properly in the prototype system, the Raspberry Pi
boards have to be within 30 meters. A concern may arise
because of that in our use scenario, the distance between a
UAV and a sensor may be much larger, and may never be
within 30 meters even at their closest positions. The fact is that
this maximum operating distance may vary based on the used
wireless communication standard and hardware quality. In our
use scenario, military standards may be used, and the txpower
of a UAV transmitter will be much higher than the txpower of
a Raspberry Pi transmitter; in addition, the antenna sensitivity
in a military-grade sensor will be higher than the sensitivity of
a Raspberry Pi receiver. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe
that the maximum operating distance in our use scenario will
be much larger than 30 meters.
D. Application Layer Secret Messages
After the connection between a dumb and a smart device
is established, an additional authentication step based on
application layer message may be included for an extra level
of security. If the secret message sent by the UAV is correct
(i.e., 1234567890 in the demonstrated case), data transmission
starts; otherwise, the connection will terminate immediately.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed a light-weight authentication
scheme based on physical layer covert channels. Our scheme
tackles the challenges in the IoT scenarios where both smart
and dumb devices are present, for example, the air-ground
collaborative reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RISTA) operations with capable UAVs and
mission-specific (legacy or dumb) sensors. We conducted a
rigorous security analysis and built a prototype system to
demonstrate that the proposed scheme is effective, portable,
and generalizable to real scenarios.
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